Toldot adam 3 -- Bet ha-midot -- Sheʼelot u-teshuvot.

ḥeleḳ 1. Musar ʻatsot ṿe-hanhagot -- ḥeleḳ 2. Musre haśkel ba-Torah -- ḥeleḳ 3. Ḥidushim u-veʼurim ba-Shas.

ʻEdut be-Hosef -- Derekh ʻets ha-ḥayim -- Refuʼat ha-nefesh -- ha-Tapuaḥ.

In the rabbinic literature from the land of Israel the poor are depicted not as passive recipients of gifts and support, but as independent agents who are responsible for their own behaviour. Communal care for the needy was expected to go beyond their basic needs for food, clothing and shelter; the physical safety of the poor and the value of their time as well as their dignity and self-worth were also included in the scope of charity. In this monograph, Yael (...) Wilfand offers a comprehensive and contextual analysis of major rabbinic texts on poverty and charity composed during the first five centuries of the Common Era in the land of Israel, principally the Mishnah, the Tosefta, the Palestinian Talmud and midrashim. She shows that, for the rabbis, the poor were not necessarily considered outsiders; indeed, some students and rabbis in Palestine may have personally experienced poverty. Wilfand claims that such socio-economic diversity contributed to the thinking of these rabbis, who rarely saw poverty as a result of transgression (in contrast to the Babylonian Talmud). This book presents a number of contrasting viewpoints held by Palestinian rabbis over such questions as: Must communal administrators ensure applicants' eligibility for alms? Should the newly indigent from wealthy families receive exceptional levels of support? Might neighbouring gentiles qualify for economic assistance from Jewish communal sources? By examining Palestinian rabbinic sources within the contexts both of the hegemonic Greco-Roman (later, Christian) milieu and of the biblical heritage, this volume offers an absorbing account of some ancient approaches to timeless social challenges. (shrink)

Sefer Ḳol min ḥayim -- Sefer Ḳol rinah ṿi-yeshuʻah -- Sefer Orḥot ḥayim ʻim perush Netiv ḥayim -- Sefer Zikhron ʻolam -- Maʼamar Zikhron Yerushalayim.

The human self model suggests that the construct of self involves functions such as agency, body-centered spatial perspectivity, and long-term unity. Vogeley, Kurthen, Falkai, and Maieret (1999) suggest that agency is subserved by the prefrontal cortex and other association areas of the cortex, spatial perspectivity by the prefrontal cortex and the parietal lobes, and long-term unity by the prefrontal cortex and the temporal lobes and that all of these functions are impaired in schizophrenia. Exploring the connections between the prefrontal cortex (...) and the construct of self, the present article extends the application of the self model to autism. It suggests that in contrast to schizophrenia, agency and spatial perspectivity are probably preserved in autism, but that, similarly to schizophrenia, long-term unity is probably impaired. This hypothesis is compatible with a model of neuropsychological dysfunction in autism in a neural network including parts of the prefrontal cortex, the temporal lobes, and the cerebellum. (shrink)

We show in rather informal terms how witness sets can be useful in both explicating some basic intuitions about scope and understanding how particular denotational semantic differences between noun phrases affect their abilities to bear out certain scopal patterns. More generally we suggest that the usual notion of scope needs to be factored into variation distributivity and maximality. This part lays some groundwork for several of the subsequent chapters and is thus of interest to all readers. The second part shows (...) that already in this initial raw form the above insights can be applied to make a novel claim concerning the availability of so-called branching readings. In logical terms a branching reading can be defined for any sentence with a subject and a direct object. However speakers of English accept only a fraction of these readings, so the question arises how the data can be predicted from the meanings of the participating quantifiers and the syntactic structure of the sentence. We propose that thinking about the behavior of quantifiers along the lines introduced in the first part leads to a simple answer to this question. (shrink)

The language of standard propositional modal logic has one operator (? or ?), that can be thought of as being determined by the quantifiers ? or ?, respectively: for example, a formula of the form ?F is true at a point s just in case all the immediate successors of s verify F.This paper uses a propositional modal language with one operator determined by a generalized quantifier to discuss a simple connection between standard invariance conditions on modal formulas and generalized (...) quantifiers: the combined generalized quantifier conditions of conservativity and extension correspond to the modal condition of invariance under generated submodels, and the modal condition of invariance under bisimulations corresponds to the generalized quantifier being a Boolean combination of ? and ? (shrink)

Sewards and Sewards argue that while computations necessary for object recognition occur throughout the ventral visual stream, object recognition awareness involves the anterior temporal lobe and the medial orbital prefrontal cortex. The present paper suggests, however, that the medial orbital prefrontal cortex has a unique contribution, namely that of producing a basic experience of a perceptual object. It is further argued that the mechanisms that produce this experience also result in making the object more important than its subparts and features. (...) Finally, it is argued that a reduction in this importance may account for some perceptual difficulties in high-functioning autism. This view is consistent with evidence for early selective abnormalities in other systems involving the medial prefrontal cortex in autism. (shrink)

This commentary discusses the relation between Grodzinsky's target article and Friederici's (1995) model of syntactic processing. The two models can be made more compatible if it is assumed that people with Broca's aphasia have a problem in trace construction rather than trace deletion, and that the process of trace construction takes place during the second early syntactic substage of Friederici's model.